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EPISTEMOGRAPHY AND ALGEBRA
Jean-Philippe Drouhard1
University of Nice
(IREM de Nice, IUFM Célestin Freinet, UMR P3 “ADEF”)
We  propose  to  address  the  problem  of  how to  know students’  knowledge  in  an 
entirely  new approach called “epistemography” which is,  roughly,  an attempt  to  
describe the structure of this knowledge. We claim that what is to be known is made 
of five tightly interrelated organised systems: the mathematical universe, the system 
of  semio-linguistic representations,  the instruments,  the rules of the mathematical 
game, and the identifiers.
Keywords:  epistemography, algebra, semiotics, language, subparadigm.
One  of  the  most  commonly  shared  principle  of  didactics  of  mathematics  is  that 
teaching must  ground on students'  previous knowledge.  Therefore  we researchers 
(and teachers too!) need to know what students know and what they are supposed to 
know.
But the point is that knowing what students are supposed to know is less easy to do 
than it appears at a first glance, particularly when they shift from primary studies to 
secondary  studies  and when there  are  frequent  curricular  changes  in  the  primary 
studies. In this case, secondary teachers cannot rely on remembering their primary 
school time; reading curricular documents is not very helpful, neither discussing with 
primary teachers. The problem is the lack of a common language, or better said, that 
the common language is not accurate enough. Saying that “students know the sense 
of operations” or that they are able to solve “simple word problems” is far too fuzzy 
and superficial.
We  propose  to  address  this  problem  (how  to  know  students’  knowledge)  in  an 
entirely  new approach  called  “epistemography”  which  is,  roughly,  an  attempt  to 
describe the structure of this knowledge.
Epistemography  is  based  on  an  attempt  to  generalise  and  conceptualise  findings 
about knowledge we made mainly during previous researches on algebraic thinking. 
According with many authors we found that semiotic and linguistic knowledge plays 
a central role in Algebraic Thinking. And we faced the following question: to what 
extent is this knowledge,  mathematical? Letters and symbols are not mathematical 
objects in the same way that numbers or sets or functions are2; but on the other hand 
1 JPDrouhard@gmail.com
2 More  precisely,  digits,  letters,  symbols  and  expressions  made  with  them  form  a  “language”.  Languages  are 
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they are equally necessary to do mathematics.
Epistemography is a description of the structure of what the subjects have to know in 
order to actually do mathematics (and not just to pretend to do mathematics!). We 
chose  to  call  this  theory  “epistemography”  because  it  is  about  knowledge 
(“epistemo-”)  but,  unlike  epistemology,  not  in  a  historical  perspective:  rather, 
epistemography is a kind of geography of knowledge.
We claim that what is to be known is made of five tightly interrelated organised 
systems: the mathematical universe, the system of semio-linguistic representations, 
the instruments, the rules of the mathematical game, and the identifiers. We will now 
present  in  detail  these  five  knowledge  systems.  Due  to  the  lack  of  space  this 
presentation  is  a  quite  schematic  and  abstract  one;  a  much  more  detailed  and 
discussed presentation of epistemography is to be written.
THE MATHEMATICAL UNIVERSE
To solve some algebraic problems, you must know that the product of two negative 
numbers is positive. You can believe that negative numbers are real numbers, or just 
“imaginary”  ones;  whatever  philosophical  option  you  take,  if  you  want  to  do 
mathematics,  you  need  to  have  some  knowledge  about  something.  We  call  a 
“mathematical object” this “something”, and the Mathematical Universe the system 
made up of these mathematical objects (e.g. numbers), their relations (e. g. rational 
numbers are real numbers) and properties (e. g. the product of two negative numbers 
is  positive).  Usually,  objects  of  the  mathematical  universe  may  be  described  as 
individuals (like the number 20) or classes (the even numbers).
SEMIO-LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS SYSTEM
How to  avoid,  however,  considering  as  belonging  to  the  mathematical  universe, 
objets or properties whose nature is totally different?  We must, actually, distinguish 
carefully (mathematical) objects (like the number 20) from their (semiolinguistic3) 
representations (like the string of characters “20” made of a  “2” and a “0”, but also 
“XX” made of two “X” or “::::: :::::” made of twenty dots). This distinction –and its 
consequences–  is  essential  and  has  been  stressed  by  many  authors  (Drouhard  & 
Teppo, 2004, Duval, 1995, 2000, 2006, Ernest, 2006, Kirshner, 1989, Radford, 2006, 
Bagni, 2007 amongst many others). Misunderstanding or neglecting this distinction 
may lead to quite severe consequences on mathematics learning and teaching studies. 
Hence our claim is that, besides knowledge about objects of mathematical universe, 
students  must  have some (at  least  practical)  knowledge of  the very complex and 
heterogeneous, and often hidden, system of semio-linguistic representations.
mathematically described by the “Language Theory” (a part of Mathematical Logic, shared with computer science).
3 “semio-” means “related to signs” and “linguistic”, “related to language”; see further.
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But,  how can we decide if  a  given property is  mathematical  or  semio-linguistic? 
There is a practical criterion: mathematic properties may be called “representation-
free”:  they  remain  true whatever  representation  system is  used.  For  example,  the 
irrationality of √2 does not depend on how integers,  square roots or fractions are 
written. Actually the Greeks’ notations of the first proof had nothing in common with 
ours (in particular they did not use any symbolic writing). Semiotic properties, on the 
contrary, rely on representational conventions. The property that in order to write 1/3 
you need an infinite number of (decimal) digits is true – in base ten only; it is false in 
base three (“0,1”: zero unit and one third) or, as in the Babylonian system, in  base 
sixty: : two times ten sixtieths.
Mathematical language
What  are  the  characteristics  of  the  semio-linguistic  system?  First  of  all,  the 
“mathematical language” (in a loose sense) is a written one4. Mathematical semio-
linguistic  units are written texts. Following and extending Laborde’s ideas (1990), 
written mathematical texts are heterogeneous, made of natural language sentences, 
symbolic writings, diagrams and tables, graphs and illustrations. Their organisation 
follows what we call the fruit cake analogy, the natural language being the dough and 
the symbolic writings, diagrams, graphs and illustrations being the fruit pieces. To 
describe rigorously such a complex structure is far from easy. 
Linguistic system
Students’ ability to understand natural language mathematical texts (the “dough”) is 
linguistic by nature. Mathematical natural language (we call it the “mathematicians 
jargon”) is mostly the natural language itself; but Laborde (1982) showed there are 
some  differences  (unusual  syntactic  constructions  like  “Let  x be  a  number...”) 
between the jargon and the mother-tongue, difficult to interpret by students.
Symbolic writings (like “b2 - 4ac > 0”) make up a language, too (Brown & Drouhard, 
2004, Drouhard et al, 2006), which is far more complex and different from mother-
tongue  than  it  appears  at  first  sight;  detailed  and  accurate  descriptions  of  this 
language can be found in Kirshner (1987) and Drouhard (1992). Students must learn 
this language and its syntax5 – which allows symbolic manipulation (Bell, 1996): the 
actual mathematic language, ruled by a rigid syntax, permits to perform operations on 
the symbolic expressions rather than on (mental or graphic) representations.
The present mathematical language is also characterised by a complex but precise 
4 which puts upside down the usual relationship between oral speech and written texts
5 the syntax is the part of the grammar which deals with the rules that relate one to another the elements of a language. 
(Syntax says that a parenthesis must be close once opened...
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semantics. Semantics (the science of the meaning) is the set of rules and procedures 
which  allows  interpreting  expressions,  in  other  words  which  allows  relating 
expressions to mathematical objects.
 The most  accurate  description of this  semantics  (how symbolic  writings refer  to 
mathematical objects and properties) is based on G. Frege’s ideas (Drouhard, 1995). 
G. Frege’s key concepts are “denotation” (which can be a numerical value (in the 
case of “20”), a numerical function (in the case of “x+1”), a truth value (in the case 
of “1 > 20”) or a boolean function (“x+1> 20”), according to the type of symbolic 
writing)6,  and  “sense”  (the  way  denotation  is  given).  The  linguistic  nature  of 
students’ difficulties with symbolic writings is often underestimated, or confused 
with conceptual difficulties. 
Semiotic system
Let’s give an example of a semiotic problem in algebra. How to represent an infinite 
series of decimals? Imagine I ask you what the properties of the number 0,666… are. 
When multiplied by 3 it gives 2? No. Actually I had in mind the number 1999/3000. 
And yes, I cheated: I broke the representational rule of decimals, which is a semiotic 
rule (on how to interpret elements like “…”) about linguistic objects (the numeric 
expressions).
There  are  more  than  one  approach  to  mathematics  semiotics,  which  were  fully 
presented in the special issue N° 134 (2003) of Educational Studies in Mathematics. 
Duval dedicated his lifelong work to an extensive and coherent theory of semiotics of 
mathematics education. Three key concepts are the semiotic representation registers, 
the treatments (within a register) and the conversions (between different registers). 
Other researchers (see amongst others Otte, 2006) are investigating how to interpret 
mathematics education using the terms of the founder of semiotics, Charles S. Peirce 
(1991): the three types of signs –index, icon, symbol– and, maybe more interesting, 
the three types of inferences –induction, abduction, deduction). 
An entire communication paper would not suffice to present even a small part of the 
outcomes of semiotics for the study of algebraic thinking. Hence we called “semio-
linguistic” the mathematics  representation system. Therefore students  must  handle 
both aspects of this representation system, the linguistic as well as the semiotic one, 
and the complex interaction between them.
INSTRUMENTS
Up to now we have seen that to do mathematics, students must not only know objects 
6 The AlNuSet software, developed by Giampaolo Chiappini allows (in a totally original way) a dynamic view of the 
denotation of algebraic expressions.
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and how to represent them: now we will see that they need also to know how to use 
instruments (Rabardel & Vérillon, 1995) to operate on the representations of objects. 
However, unlike object/representation opposition, instruments are not characterised 
by their nature (mathematical objects can also be tools, as noted by Douady, 1986) 
but instead by their use. Students, then, must learn what these instruments are and 
how to use them. Given that instruments are only characterised by their use, it  is 
possible  to  propose  a  typology,  based  on  their  nature:  material  instruments  (like 
rulers  or  compasses,  see  Bagni,  2007),  conceptual  instruments  (mathematical 
properties,  like  theorems),  semiotic  instruments  (manipulations  on  semiotic 
representations) – this idea appears in L. S. Vygotsky, 1986); eventually one may 
consider “meta” instruments like strategies and, more generally, meta-rules.
THE RULES OF THE MATHEMATICAL GAME
We have  seen  that  students  must  know what  mathematical  objects  are  and  their 
properties, how to represent them and how to use instruments. Is this sufficient to do 
mathematics?  Not  at  all:  using  a  given  instrument  to  operate  on  a  given 
representation may be, or not,  legitimate (even if done properly).  For instance,  to 
solve  some  numerical  problems,  some  procedures  are  arithmetical  (and  are  not 
legitimate in algebra) and other are algebraic (and are not legitimate in arithmetics).
Therefore algebra is not just a question of objects, representations and tools, but also 
of rules, which are saying what the actions are that we may or may not do amongst 
the actions we can do. Algebra is not a game in the same sense that chess is a game, 
but, like chess, algebra does have rules. These rules, moreover, are changing with 
passing times: the present way of doing differs from, say, the Renaissance Italian way 
of  doing  algebra.  L.  Wittgenstein  (the  “second  Wittgenstein”,  the  author  of  the 
Philosophical Remarks, or On Certainty, 1986) is an invaluable guide to clarify the 
extremely complex relationship between objects, signs, practices and rules. (Ernest, 
1994, Bagni, 2006).
SUBPARADIGMS
Some rules (in particular logic) are universal for all mathematics. But other rules are 
related to  a  certain  domain  of  mathematics.  A square number  is  always positive, 
except  when studying complex numbers.  We call  these  domains  “subparadigms”, 
which are analogous Kuhn’s paradigms, but less vast, and commensurable between 
them). This notion of subparadigm allows us to understand the shift from arithmetics 
to algebra. Semantics (and instrumental value) of the “=” sign change, thus objects 
(the  equalities,  the  expression  with  letters)  also  change.  The  semiotic  systems, 
although looking quite the same (“2+1 = 3” and “2+x = 3”), are different in fact.
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IDENTIFYING KNOWLEDGE
A last  type  of  knowledge  allows  us  to  identify  (or  recognise)  if  what  we  do  is 
mathematical or not, and to identify to what domain of mathematics it belongs. When 
a student writes something that superficially looks like algebra but actually is wrong 
or meaningless, the teacher might say: “This is not algebra”; and if later the student 
succeeds  in  writing  a  meaningful  and  correct  algebraic  text,  the  teacher  might 
comment:  “This is   algebra”.  With these statements,  the teacher speaks about the 
student’s  text  but  also  about  algebra;  he  is  actually  teaching  the  student  what is 
algebra – and what is not7 (Sackur et al., 2005). We call this Identifying Knowledge; 
it  is  also  that  which  allows  us  to  recognise  whether  a  mathematical  problem is 
arithmetical  or  algebraic,  and  to  choose  the  appropriate  instruments  to  solve  it 
(without  certainty:  this  kind  of  knowledge  is  more  abductive  that  deductive,  see 
Panizza, 2005).
THE LAYERED DESCRIPTION
As said above, epistemography is not the theory of everything (or, better said,  of 
every  kind  of  knowledge)!  Firstly,  we only  consider  here  the  part  of  knowledge 
which is specific to mathematics;  this leaves aside nonspecific knowledge, related 
with  the  use  of  (oral  and  written)  natural  language  or  with  general  reasoning 
capabilities. “Mathematical activities”, however, remains too vague to allow a precise 
description. Then, by analogy with the Internet reference model, which is a layered 
abstract  description for  the  very  complex  communications  and computer  network 
protocol  design,  we  propose  a  layered   description  of  students’  mathematical 
activities. 
The five descriptive layers of students’ mathematical activities are:
1. the School Layer (what are the students’ rights and duties, why and how to 
work in the classrooms and at home, what kind of participation is expected by 
the teacher etc.). This is what french-speaking researchers like Sirota (1993) or 
Perrenoud  (1994)  call  ““being  a  student”  as  a  job”8.  A  great  number  of 
students’ difficulties may be analysed in terms of the school layer: when they 
don’t want to learn, or don’t know how to, for instance.
2. The Maths Classroom Layer (how to do maths in the classrooms and at home, 
what kind of participation is expected by the maths teacher and what is the 
math teacher supposed to do, etc.). This part of the students’ activities is ruled 
7 which would be almost impossible to do with an explicit discourse within this context: definition or characterization 
of mathematics are epistemological statements, not mathematical statements
8 unfortunately,  according to Dessus (2004) this concept  is almost  non existent  in English-speaking sociology of 
education studies.
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by what Brousseau (1997) calls the didactical contract (see also Sarrazy, 1995, 
for  an  extensive  survey  of  this  notion).  Many  students’  difficulties  can  be 
analysed in terms of didactical contract, as it was brilliantly done by Brousseau 
(ibid) and followers.
3. The Modelling Layer, which is the description of, for instance, how students 
change a word problem into a matematical problem, or even how they change 
a mathematical problem (i. e. expressed in mathematical terms) into an other 
problem which they can solve with their mathematical tools. A whole field of 
mathematics  education  is  devoted  to  the  modelling  part  of  the  students’ 
mathematical activities (see for instance Lesh and Doerr, 2002).
4.  The  Discursive  Layer,  which  is  the  description  of  students’  reasoning  on 
mathematical objects. This reasoning may be expressed by a discourse (like “if 
x is greater than -3 then x+3 is positive and therefore...”), hence the name of 
this description layer9. In France, Duval (2006) is a main contributor in this 
domain,  which  is  closely  related  to  researches  on  argumentation  (see  for 
instance Yackel and Cobb, 1997) and on proofs (see for instance Gila Hanna, 
2000).
5. The deepest, Symbolic Manipulation Layer, describes how students operate on 
symbolic forms to yield other symbolic forms which represent the solutions of 
the problem. In the case of algebraic thinking, not too many authors (see for 
instance  Bell,  1996 or  Brown & Drouhard,  2003)  stress  on that   –  mainly 
because on the contrary it is often overemphasized by textbooks and teachers.
It  is  important  to  notice  that  what  is  layered is  the description,  not  the student’s 
activity. It is very similar to what happens in linguistics: the language’s description is 
split in phonetics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics etc. but the subject’s act of speech, 
on the contrary, is of a whole.
CONCLUSION
A way to cope with the problem of identifying students’ mathematical knowledge has 
long been to focus on students’ solving abilities and this can explain the prominent 
role  which  has  been  given  to  assessment  throughout  the  world.  However,  many 
mathematics  educators  remain  reluctant  to  reduce  assessment  criteria  to  solving 
abilities. Our point is that solving abilities are not so relevant clues on what students 
know and what they are supposed to know. On the one hand, the student’s failure in 
achieving a task does not give much information on what his or her  deficiencies or 
9 It is not called “reasoning layer” since that could lead to the erroneous idea that there is no reasoning outside this 
level.
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misconceptions are. On the other hand, the student’s success may just show his or her 
technical abilities, but we cannot be sure that s/he understood conceptually.
Then, how can we determine what students know and are supposed to know? We 
claim that epistemography can provide accurate answers to this question. 
REFERENCES
Bagni, G. (2006). Linguaggio, Storia e Didattica della Matematica. Bologna: 
Pitagora.
Bagni, G. (2007). Rappresentare la matematica. Roma: Aracne.
Bell, A. (1996). Algebraic Thought and the Role of a Manipulable Symbolic 
Language, in N. Bednarz, C. Kieran & L. Lee (Eds), Approaches to Algebra (pp. 
115-136). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Brousseau, G. (1997). Theory of Didactical Situations in Mathematics, Edited and 
translated by N. Balacheff, M. Cooper, R. Sutherland & V. Warfield. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer.
Brown, L. & Drouhard, J-Ph. (2004). Responses to "The core of algebra". In K. 
Stacey, H. Chick & M. Kendal (Eds.), The teaching and learning of algebra; The 
12th ICMI study. (35-44). Norwood, MA: Kluwer.
Dessus, Ph. (2004). Métier d'élève et travail scolaire. Personal webpage:
http://web.upmf-grenoble.fr/sciedu/pdessus/sapea/metiereleve.html
Douady, R. (1986). Jeux de cadres et dialectique outil/objet. Recherches en 
Didactique des Mathématiques, 7(2), 5-32.
Drouhard, J-Ph. (1992). Les Écritures Symboliques de l’Algèbre élémentaire. Thèse 
de Doctorat. Paris: Université Paris 7.
Drouhard, J-Ph. (1995). Algèbre, calcul symbolique et didactique. In R. Noirfalise & 
M.-J. Perrin-Glorian (Dir.), Actes 8èmeÉcole d'Été de Didactique des 
Mathématiques. Clermont-Ferrand: IREM.
Drouhard, J-Ph. (2007). Prolégomènes épistémographiques à l’étude des transitions 
dans l’enseignement des mathématiques. In N. Bednarz & Cl. Mary (Eds.) 
L'enseignement des mathématiques face aux défis de l'école et des communautés. 
Actes du colloque EMF 2006 . CD. Sherbrooke, QC: Éditions du CRP.
Drouhard, J-Ph., Panizza, M., Puig, L. & Radford, L. (2006). Algebraic Thinking. In 
M. Bosh (Ed.).: Proc. of CERME 4. CD. Barcelona: IQS FUNDEMI, Universitat 
Ramon Llull.
Drouhard, J-Ph. & Teppo A. (2004). Symbols and Language. In K. Stacey, H. Chick, 
8/ 10
ha
l-0
04
10
06
2,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
7 
Au
g 
20
09
Drouhard-CERME6.odt
M. Kendal (Eds.), The teaching and learning of algebra (227-264). Norwood, MA: 
Kluwer.
Duval, R. (1995). Sémiosis et Pensée Humaine, Registres sémiotiques et  
apprentissages intellectuels. Berne: Peter Lang.
Duval, R. (2000). Basic issues for research in mathematics education, Plenary 
Address. In T. Nakahara & M. Koyama (Eds.), Proceedings of PME 24 (pp. 1.55 – 
1.69). Hiroshima University.
Duval, R. (2006). A cognitive analysis of problems of comprehension in a learning of 
mathematics. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 61, 103-131.
Ernest, P. (1997). Social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics. Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press.
Ernest, P. (Ed.) (1994).  Mathematics Education and Philosophy: An International  
Perspective. London: The Falmer Press.
Hanna, G. (2000). Proof, Explanation and Exploration: An Overview. Educational 
Studies in Mathematics, 44, 1-3.
Kirshner, D. (1987). Linguistic analysis of symbolic elementary algebra, 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Vancouver, BC: University of British 
Columbia.
Kirshner, D. (1989). The Visual Syntax of Algebra. Journal for the Research in 
Mathematics Education, 20 (3), 276-287.
Laborde, C. (1982). Langue naturelle et écriture symbolique deux codes en 
interaction dans l’enseignement mathématique. Thèse d’État. Grenoble: Université 
Joseph Fourier.
Laborde, C. (1990). Language and Mathematics. In J. Kilpatrick & P. Nesher (Eds.), 
Mathematics and cognition (pp. 4-19). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lesh, R. A. & Doerr, H. (Eds) (2002). Beyond constructivism: a models and 
modelling perspective on teaching, learning, and problem solving in mathematics 
education, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlaum.
Otte, M. (2006). Matematical Epistemology from a Peircean Semiotic Point of View. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 61 (1-2), 11-38.
Panizza, M. (2005). Razonar y Conocer : Aportes a la comprensión de la 
racionalidad matemática de los alumnos. Buenos Aires : Libros del Zorzal. 
Peirce, C. S. (1991) Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic. J. Hoopes (Ed.). Chapel 
Hill (NC): The University of North Carolina Press.
9/ 10
ha
l-0
04
10
06
2,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
7 
Au
g 
20
09
Drouhard-CERME6.odt
Perrenoud, P. (1994).  Métier d’élève et sens du travail scolaire. Paris : ESF.
Radford, L. (2006). The Anthropology of Meaning. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics. 61(1-2), 39-65.
Sackur C., Assude T., Maurel, M., Drouhard, J-Ph., Paquelier, Y. (2005) : 
L’expérience de la nécessité épistémique. Recherches en Didactique des 
Mathématiques, 25 (1), 57-90.
Sarrazy, B. (1995) Le contrat didactique. Note de synthèse, Rev. Fr. de Péd. 112, p. 
85-118.
Sirota, R. (1993). "Le métier d'élève", Note de synthèse, Revue française de 
pédagogie, 104, pp. 85-108.
Vérillon, P., Rabardel, P. (1995). Cognition and artifacts: a contribution to the study 
of though in relation to instrumented activity. Eur. J. of Psych. of Education. 10 
(1), 77-101.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and Language - Revised Edition. A. Kozulin (Ed.). 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
Wittgenstein L., Anscombe G.E.M., Von Wright G.H. (1986). On Certainty. Harper, 
Row.
Yackel, E., Cobb, P. (1996). Sociomathematical Norms, Argumentation, and 
Autonomy in Mathematics. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 27, 
(4). 458-477.
10/ 10
ha
l-0
04
10
06
2,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
7 
Au
g 
20
09
